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INTRODUCTION 
In 1994, John O’Flannery, an American living in California, learned 
that he was eligible for Irish citizenship because his grandmother had been 
born in Ireland.1 He proceeded to acquire Irish citizenship, and then his 
wife and children followed suit.2 In 2006, John’s daughter, Carol, 
explained that an Irish passport allowed her to work legally in Italy and 
Austria.3 Meanwhile, one of her sisters relied on her Irish citizenship to buy 
property in Italy, and John and his wife considered doing the same to retire 
there.4 No one in the family displayed any intent to return to, reside in, or 
buy property in Ireland. 
The case of the O’Flannery family illustrates a novel twenty-first 
century development in the European Union (EU): individuals are 
acquiring citizenship from their ancestral homelands and using their new 
nationalities not to obtain the privileges and shoulder the burdens of that 
country, but instead to secure the economic benefits of EU citizenship. As a 
result, thousands of non-Europeans are able to gain access to European 
nations with which they have no connection through a “back door”—
because of the EU’s freedom of movement across its member states, 
gaining citizenship to one member state makes access available to all. 
Europe experienced drastic changes in the twentieth century, and with 
them came three key developments that have led to the new citizenship 
phenomenon addressed in this Note. Two of the developments occurred at 
the transnational level. The first is the recent acceptance of dual citizenship. 
Throughout history, dual citizenship was unlawful, and its conception was 
generally frowned upon. But by the new millennium, the concept had 
begun to garner acceptance, especially after the European Court of Justice’s 
decision in Micheletti v. Cantabria,5 which permitted an individual to 
retain two nationalities. The second is the development of a transnational 
Europe, most notably, the EU’s recent eastern expansion to include nations 
from behind the former Iron Curtain. The transnational character of the 
continent has been furthered by the guaranteed freedom of movement 
between the EU’s now twenty-eight member states. The third development 
has occurred on the domestic level: nations have adopted national 
citizenship laws based on ancestry and heritage, as well as laws that grant 
 
 1.  Gretchen Lang, When Roots Translate Into a 2d Passport, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 29, 2006), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/09/29/style/29iht-areturn.2977035.html. 
 2.  Id. 
 3.  Id. 
 4.  Id. 
 5.  Case C-369/90, Micheletti v. Cantabria, 1992 E.C.R. I-4239. 
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“restitution citizenship” to remedy past state wrongs. I refer to these 
collectively as models of “birthright citizenship.” 
The amalgamation of these three factors—only first realized in the 
past few years—has created a new class of individuals in Europe: birthright 
citizens who lack a genuine link or affinity to the country of their acquired 
nationality. As this Note will show, this new class of persons claims 
citizenship based not on traditional concepts of “ethnic return migration,” 
but rather as a means to access the economic perquisites of the EU; they 
seek not access to their motherland, but to the Union as a whole. In the 
absence of any common European citizenship standards, and thus with each 
member state free to choose its own approach, the trend of transnational 
EU birthright citizens will continue to grow as long as economic prospects 
remain plausible across the European continent. 
Part I of this Note reviews foundational understandings of citizenship 
as a practical and legal term, and lays out the key divide between the 
principles of jus soli and jus sanguinis. 
Part II addresses the two transnational developments that occurred 
during the end of the twentieth century and the beginning of the twenty-
first. The first is the emergence of dual citizenship, which is only now 
starting to garner international acceptance. The second is the newfound 
connectedness of Europe. With the twenty-first century acceptance of 
Soviet and other Eastern European nations into the EU, the Union now 
includes twenty-eight member states and has grown to connect East and 
West. The third is the development of EU citizenship and the pivotal rights 
to move, reside, and work freely in all member states that it entails. 
Part III addresses developments in European citizenship laws since the 
Second World War. It first discusses nations that have adopted citizenship 
laws based on one’s ethnicity, emphasizing laws that look beyond the 
nationality of one’s parents. Next addressed is restitution citizenship, which 
is divided between laws based on the loss of territory and those seeking to 
remedy governmental wrongs. 
Part IV analyzes who is taking advantage of the new legal framework 
produced by the conjunction of birthright citizenship laws and the EU 
freedom of movement. Generally, the beneficiaries are non-EU residents 
with a provable historical link to Europe who live in, and intend to gain 
citizenship from, a nation that allows dual citizenship. Two of the most 
prominent populations seeking EU citizenship are those in Latin America 
and in Israel. Latin Americans are able to take advantage of ancestral 
connections mostly with Spain, whereas Israelis look more towards the new 
EU nations in Eastern Europe. 
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Part V concludes by assessing birthright citizenship within the context 
of the EU. I argue that those who are taking advantage of the new legal 
framework are utilizing the EU as its own entity, by moving to the most 
advantageous nation within the EU, regardless of the country through 
which citizenship was acquired. As a result, the new framework challenges 
the historical understanding of citizenship and its associated respon-
sibilities. Ultimately, this Note suggests limitations on restitution 
citizenship and emphasizes the recent nature of this phenomenon, calling 
for further research by the EU to better understand the population transfers 
and economic effects that these new citizenship rules have brought upon 
the Union. 
I.  THE MEANING OF CITIZENSHIP 
There are multiple layers to the meaning of citizenship, the first of 
which is its practical meaning. This is the way in which individuals 
“participat[e] in public life (which is broader than political life), in their 
states of citizenship, where public life includes both civil society and those 
spheres traditionally understood as private.”6 Governing this practicing 
citizenry is the state, which “seeks to create ‘a stably coherent population’ 
with a shared political allegiance and sense of ‘solidarity, symbolic 
identification, and community.’”7 
The United States Citizenship and Immigration Services agency 
(USCIS) explains to prospective citizens through naturalization that 
applying for citizenship is a “significant” decision: “Citizenship offers 
many benefits and equally important responsibilities. By applying, you are 
demonstrating your commitment to this country and our form of 
government.”8 USCIS lays out seven rights and nine responsibilities 
embedded in the meaning of citizenship. Included in the rights are not only 
those codified in the Bill of Rights (e.g., expression, worship, fair trial), but 
also the ability to elect public officials and to run for elected office.9 The 
 
 6.  Kim Barry, Home and Away: The Construction of Citizenship in an Emigration Context, 81 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 11, 24–25 (2006) (alteration in original) (footnote omitted) (quoting Bart van 
Steenbergen, The Condition of Citizenship: An Introduction, in THE CONDITION OF CITIZENSHIP 1, 2 
(Bart van Steenbergen ed., 1994)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 7.  Id. at 24 (citing DEREK HEATER, WHAT IS CITIZENSHIP? 174 (1999)); Peter H. Schuck, 
Membership in the Liberal Polity: The Devaluation of American Citizenship, in IMMIGRATION AND THE 
POLITICS OF CITIZENSHIP IN EUROPE AND NORTH AMERICA 51, 65 (William Rogers Brubaker ed., 
1989)). 
 8.  Citizenship Rights and Responsibilities, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS., 
http://www.uscis.gov/citizenship/learners/citizenship-rights-and-responsibilities (last visited Mar. 11, 
2015). 
 9.  Id. 
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countervailing responsibilities include supporting and defending the 
Constitution, staying informed and participating in the democratic process, 
paying taxes, and serving on juries or in the nation’s defense as necessary.10 
These responsibilities evoke John F. Kennedy’s famous words, “[M]y 
fellow Americans: ask not what your country can do for you—ask what 
you can do for your country.”11 
Beyond the practical is the legal definition of a citizen: a person who 
gains recognition as a fully participating member of a country’s society. 
The legal significance of citizenship has two tiers: one domestic and the 
other international.12 On the domestic level, as alluded to above, citizenship 
concerns the duties and obligations an individual has to his society. 
Citizenship theorist Ayelet Shachar has compared these to property rights, 
signifying one’s citizenship as a “bundle of rights.” Property rights, she 
explains, “gain meaning only when they are connected to a system of law 
and governance that can enforce them.”13 Under citizenship laws, “what 
each citizen holds is not a private entitlement to a tangible thing, but a 
relationship to other members and to a particular (usually national) 
government that creates enforceable rights and duties.”14 And, even today, 
allocating citizenship is exclusively within the government’s purview: 
“Securing full membership in the political community remains one of the 
few goods that even the mightiest economic conglomerate cannot offer to a 
skilled migrant or a talented athlete; only governments can allocate the 
precious property of citizenship.”15 
On the international stage, citizenship separates insiders from 
outsiders—it is used by countries “to delimit [individuals] . . . who as a rule 
are nationals of other States.”16 Additionally, citizens can call on their state 
for protection or intervention under certain circumstances,17 and they 
generally maintain the right to return from abroad to their own country.18 
 
 10.  Id. 
 11.  John F. Kennedy, President of the U.S., Inaugural Address (Jan. 20, 1961). 
 12.  Barry, supra note 6, at 21. 
 13.  Ayelet Shachar, Earned Citizenship: Property Lessons for Immigration Reform, 23 YALE J.L. 
& HUMAN. 110, 123 (2011) [hereinafter Shachar, Earned Citizenship]. 
 14.  Id. at 125. 
 15.  Ayelet Shachar, Picking Winners: Olympic Citizenship and the Global Race for Talent, 120 
YALE L.J. 2088, 2105 (2011). 
 16.  PAUL WEIS, NATIONALITY AND STATELESSNESS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 250 (1956) 
(emphasis added). 
 17.  Barry, supra note 6, at 22. 
 18.  Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, U.N. Doc. A/RES/217(III), 
art. 13 (Dec. 10, 1948). 
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Most countries use one of two principles to determine citizenship by 
birth. The first is jus soli, or “right of the soil.” Under the purest form of 
this system, a child becomes a citizen of the country in which that child is 
born.19 This English common law principle expanded to colonial 
jurisdictions around the world and is still the basis of the United States’ 
citizen-by-birth laws.20 One benefit of jus soli regimes is that children of 
new immigrants are automatically incorporated into the new country with 
citizenship rights. Therefore, this system is often viewed as the “democratic 
and inclusive” model of citizenship acquisition.21 
Opposing jus soli is the principle of jus sanguinis, or “right of the 
blood.” This principle is rooted in the French Civil Code of 1803, which, in 
light of the French Revolution, tried to depart from the country’s feudal 
past and a tradition resembling jus soli.22 Instead, the new principle of jus 
sanguinis, bearing a connection to Roman times, spread across Europe, 
“link[ing] citizens to each other and to their joint political enterprise 
through membership in the nation state.”23 A modern example of this pure 
form is Hungary’s citizenship law, under which “[t]he child of a Hungarian 
citizen shall become a Hungarian citizen by birth.”24 Birthplace is 
irrelevant. Jus sanguinis is therefore often seen as exclusionary. Regardless 
 
 19.  This tradition originated in medieval England, where “‘ligeance’ and ‘true and faithful 
obedience’ to the sovereign were owed by a subject from birth.” AYELET SHACHAR, THE BIRTHRIGHT 
LOTTERY: CITIZENSHIP AND GLOBAL INEQUALITY 114 (2009). As Lord Edward Coke stated in a 
famous English opinion, “for as soon as he is born he oweth by birth-right ligeance and obedience to his 
Sovereign.” Calvin’s Case (1608) 77 Eng. Rep. 377, 382 (K.B.); 7 Co. Rep. 1 a, 4 b. 
 20.  See Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-414, § 301(a)(1), 66 Stat. 163, 
235 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1401(a) (2012)) (stating a national at birth will include “a 
person born in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof”). A child can also gain 
American citizenship at birth even if born abroad if certain conditions are met, depending on the 
nationality of the parents and the amount of time they had lived in the United States. See id. § 301(a) 
(3)–(7), 66 Stat. at 235–36 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1401(c)–(g) (2012)). 
 21.  SHACHAR, supra note 19, at 115. Although the United States continues to maintain such a 
broad policy, other common law nations, including England, have limited such broadness: in England, a 
descent component has been added, so that automatic citizenship is only conferred upon children born 
within English territory if the child is born to a citizen or permanent resident. Id. at 116. 
 22.  Id. at 120. 
 23.  Id. The spread in Europe coincides with the great period of nationalism that engulfed the 
continent, especially at the time of the 1848 revolutions. Thus, it is possible that due to Europe’s 
growing imperialism into Africa and Asia (correlating with increased nationalism), European nations 
found the principle of jus sanguinis, one based on one’s heritage, an enticing option in the colonization 
process (through which “outsiders” might have been brought back to the mainland). See id. at 120–21 
(discussing how jus sanguinis accommodates people “deemed . . . as the nation’s scattered sons and 
daughters whose return the home country patiently awaits”). 
 24.  1993. évi LV. törvény a magyar állampolgárságról (Act LV of 1993 on Hungarian 
Citizenship) art. 3(1) (Hung.), translated in ACT LV of 1993 on Hungarian Citizenship, EUR. UNION 
DEMOCRACY OBSERVATORY ON CITIZENSHIP (Jan. 1, 2009), http://eudo-citizenship.eu/National DB/ 
docs/HUN%20Act%20LV%20of%201993%20(as%20of%20Jan%202009,%20English).pdf. 
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of being born in a country, a person cannot gain citizenship—in the 
principle’s purest form—if he is not a member of the country’s ethnic or 
historic population.25 European countries nonetheless generally maintain 
the jus sanguinis approach, which made it possible to develop citizenship 
laws based on heritage, one of the key elements of the evolution towards 
today’s new class of birthright citizens. 
II. CONCURRENT DEVELOPMENTS INFLUENCING EU 
CITIZENSHIP 
Dual citizenship was viewed negatively for most of Western history. It 
was seen not only as unworkable, but as “an evil” that could cause conflict 
between nations. Seemingly equally untenable was a unified Europe. Both 
of these developments nonetheless occurred in the latter years of the 
twentieth century, and came vividly to life in the beginning of the twenty-
first century. Given these developments, outsiders gaining citizenship to an 
EU nation gain not only access to that nation, but to twenty-eight nations 
across the European continent. 
A. The Emergence of Dual Citizenship 
With the framework of citizenship in mind, one might now begin to 
question what it means to be a dual citizen under the pure forms of jus 
sanguinis and jus soli. How can one have multiple citizenships if his or her 
citizenship is solely determined by place of birth? Conversely, how can one 
have multiple citizenships if he or she simply inherits his or her parents’ 
citizenship? Absent such global movement as began in the late nineteenth 
century and exploded in the twentieth, these issues would have remained 
merely theoretical. Before the great wave of migration to the United States, 
and before freedom of movement in Europe, these problems were 
presumably uncommon. But today, dual citizenship has much greater 
significance. 
1.  Twentieth Century Developments 
Historically, maintaining multiple citizenships was impossible. The 
United States, for example, prohibited dual citizenship as early as 1795 
with the passage of a Naturalization Act, which stated that any individual 
becoming a citizen must “renounce forever all allegiance and fidelity to any 
 
 25.  Ayelet Shachar has proposed a third category of birthright citizenship, which she calls jus 
nexi, or citizenship based on rootedness. She proposes that “[i]nstead of making citizenship turn solely 
on the initial, almost frozen-in-time moment of entry, some proximity or nexus must be made between 
taking root and pursuing full membership status in the polity and an actual share in its rights and 
obligations.” Shachar, Earned Citizenship, supra note 13, at 122. 
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foreign prince, potentate, state or sovereignty whatever, and particularly, by 
name, the prince, potentate, state or sovereignty whereof such alien may, at 
the time, be a citizen or subject.”26 As dual citizenship scholar Peter Spiro 
wrote, “the key feature of this account is the serious threat that dual 
nationality posed to world order.”27 
Much of the difficulty over dual citizenship stemmed from mandatory 
military service, as dual citizenship was feared to create conflicting 
obligations between nation states. If a person was a citizen of France and 
Germany, for instance, this brought about a “physical impossibility of 
performing simultaneously the rights and duties of citizenship in different 
geographical locations.”28 If that dual citizen were required to fight against 
his other country of citizenship, he would be breaking his obligations to at 
least one of the nations. 
But, in practice, this did not cause much concern. Under natural law, a 
person had “perpetual allegiance, under which birth allegiance to the 
sovereign was indissoluble,” and as long as migration remained an 
“epiphenomenon,” the issue was more theoretical.29 As travel between 
nations began to surge, however, especially with cross-Atlantic travel, the 
concern over traitorous individuals again arose: “Dual nationals 
represented instability in a world in which the downside risks of instability 
were serious, in an era in which there were no brake triggers on the way to 
war.”30 
Europe maintained its stance against dual citizenship for most of the 
twentieth century. The continental position came to light in the 1930 Hague 
Convention on Certain Questions Relating to the Conflict of Nationality 
Laws, organized and written by the League of Nations. The preamble 
makes the Convention’s purpose clear: “[I]t is in the general interest of the 
international community to secure that all its members should recognise 
that every person should have a nationality and should have one nationality 
only.”31 The Convention recognized “accordingly that the ideal towards 
which the efforts of humanity should be directed in this domain is the 
 
 26.  Naturalization Act of 1795, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 414 (1795). This language of renunciation is still in 
place today in the United States for naturalization. See Naturalization Oath of Allegiance to the United 
States of America, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS. (June 25, 2014), http://www.uscis.gov/us-
citizenship/naturalization-test/naturalization-oath-allegiance-united-states-america. 
 27.  Peter J. Spiro, Dual Citizenship as Human Right, 8 INT’L J. CONST. L. 111, 112 (2010) 
[hereinafter Spiro, Dual Citizenship]. 
 28.  NISSIM BAR-YAACOV, DUAL NATIONALITY 265 (1961). 
 29.  Spiro, Dual Citizenship, supra note 27, at 113. 
 30.  Id. 
 31.  Hague Convention on Certain Questions Relating to the Conflict of Nationality Laws, pmbl., 
Apr. 12, 1930, 179 L.N.T.S. 89. 
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abolition of all cases . . . of double nationality.”32 The Convention thus laid 
out methods for countries to determine the sole nationalities of individuals 
in their territories and abroad.33 
It was not until the 1990s that a large shift came, aided greatly by the 
abandonment of conscription. With the end of the Cold War, many 
European nations decreased their armed forces: Belgium and the 
Netherlands started the trend in 1996, and after another decade, thirteen 
other states had followed suit.34 Along with similar restructuring of various 
nations’ tax systems, “[d]omicile, rather than citizenship,” had become 
“increasingly important as a determinant of obligations owed to states.”35 
The European Court of Justice (ECJ) also played a pivotal role in this 
evolution, especially with its landmark 1992 decision in Micheletti v. 
Cantabria.36 Mario Vicente Micheletti was from Argentina (with Argentine 
citizenship), but he had acquired Italian nationality (through his parents’ 
birth in Italy) in order to work in Spain as a dentist.37 Micheletti 
subsequently applied for permanent residence in Spain because, thanks to 
his new Italian passport, he had become a European Community national 
with the ability to work in Spain.38 Spain, however, denied Micheletti 
residence because under Spanish law, Micheletti’s sole nationality was that 
of his former residence, Argentina.39 
 
 32.  Id. 
 33.  Id. Another European convention was passed in 1963 by the Council of Europe, entitled the 
Convention on Reduction of Cases of Multiple Nationality and on Military Obligations in Cases of 
Multiple Nationality. The preamble to this convention stated again that “cases of multiple nationality 
are liable to cause difficulties and that joint action [should be taken] to reduce as far as possible the 
number of cases of multiple nationality.” Convention on Reduction of Cases of Multiple Nationality 
and on Military Obligations in Cases of Multiple Nationality, pmbl., May 6, 1963, E.T.S. No. 043. This 
convention appeared to conclude that the largest difficulty with dual nationality was the competing 
conscription requirements in “[c]onsidering it desirable that persons possessing the nationality of two or 
more Contracting Parties should be required to fulfil their military obligations in relation to one of those 
Parties only.” Id. 
 34.  Karl W. Haltiner & Tibor Szvircsev Tresch, New Trends in Civil-Military Relations: The 
Decline of Conscription in Europe 2 (paper presented at the Inter-University Seminar on Armed Forces 
and Society, Chi., Ill., Oct. 26–28, 2007), http://www.vtg.admin.ch/internet/vtg/de/home/ 
schweizerarmee/sorganisation/hkaneu/milak/militaerwissenschaftliche/militaersozioligie/publikationen.
parsys.93405.downloadList.13761.DownloadFile.tmp/513haltinerszvircsevnewtrendsincivilmilitaryrelat
ions.pdf. 
 35.  Peter J. Spiro, A New International Law of Citizenship, 105 AM. J. INT’L L. 694, 733 n.272 
(2011) [hereinafter Spiro, A New International Law of Citizenship]. 
 36.  Case C-369/90, Micheletti v. Cantabria, 1992 E.C.R. I-4239. 
 37.  Id. at I-4260. 
 38.  Id. 
 39.  Id. at I-4261. 
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The ECJ was required to interpret Article 52 of the European 
Economic Community (EEC) Treaty, which states that freedom of 
establishment is granted to all persons who are “nationals of a Member 
State.”40 In interpreting this seemingly straightforward Article, the Court 
stated: “it is not permissible . . . to restrict the effects of the grant of the 
nationality of another Member State by imposing an additional condition 
for recognition of that nationality.”41 Therefore, “Member States are not 
entitled to challenge [a citizen’s] status on the ground that the person[] 
concerned might also have the nationality of a non-member country which, 
under the legislation of the host Member State, overrides that of the 
Member State.”42 Ultimately, the Court held that member states were 
barred “from denying a national of another Member State who possesses at 
the same time the nationality of a non-member country entitlement to that 
freedom on the ground that the law of the host State deems him to be a 
national of the non-member country.”43 
Micheletti was significant, as the ECJ essentially held that countries 
must overlook their own citizenship laws in determining a person’s 
nationality. If a person can prove nationality of any member of the 
European Community, then the individual shall be recognized as a member 
of the European Community regardless of having another nationality as 
well. As such, the ECJ impliedly recognized the principle of dual 
citizenship and laid the foundation for the birthright citizenship 
phenomenon analyzed herein. 
2.  Dual Citizenship Today 
The European tide formally turned in 1997 with the European 
Convention on Nationality. Unlike the prior European conventions, which 
had all condemned dual citizenship, the 1997 Convention noted “the 
desirability of finding appropriate solutions to consequences of multiple 
nationality and in particular as regards the rights and duties of multiple 
nationals.”44 This was a clear change in rhetoric from the earlier 
conventions: dual citizenship was a part of society, and its consequences 
must no longer be eliminated, but rather, understood and accepted. Among 
other developments, the Convention required states to accept the multiple 
nationalities of children born with more than one, as well as those of 
 
 40.  Id. at I-4262. 
 41.  Id. 
 42.  Id. at I-4263 (emphasis added). 
 43.  Id. 
 44.  European Convention on Nationality, pmbl., Nov. 6, 1997, 37 I.L.M. 47 (emphasis added). 
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persons who acquired an additional nationality through marriage.45 This 
Convention was deemed a “watershed,” being the “first multilateral 
undertaking that protects dual nationality.”46 This so-called “partial 
protection of dual citizenship . . . shifted the discourse to one that accounts 
for the interests of the individuals, not just of states.”47 
In 2009, a team led by University of Lucerne Professor Joachim 
Blatter combined, analyzed, and assessed data from nine global surveys 
regarding dual citizenship administered over the previous several years. 
The group’s studies “reveal a clear global trend: the acceptance of dual 
citizenship has strongly risen in the last twenty to thirty years.”48 The team 
found that, of the 189 countries analyzed, in the early twenty-first century, 
eighty-seven showed “a rather positive stance” towards dual citizenship, 
whereas only seventy-seven showed a more negative stance.49 More 
specifically, they found that seventy-three countries fully accept dual 
citizenship, while only fifty-three countries outright reject it.50 And with 
regard to the EU, the authors ultimately concluded that fourteen EU states 
fully accept dual citizenship.51 Since the Blatter et al. study, there has been 
even further acceptance of dual citizenship in Europe. In October 2013, 
Latvia amended its Citizenship Law to permit dual citizenship,52 and in 
May 2015, the Lithuanian parliament backed plans to hold a referendum on 
dual citizenship, which has been proposed for October 2016.53 
Germany illustrates well the evolving acceptance of dual citizenship. 
Germany was traditionally in the European mainstream regarding dual 
citizenship—its Constitutional Court in 1974 had denounced the status “as 
an evil that should be avoided or eliminated in the interest of states as well 
as the interests of the affected citizen.”54 Until 1999, one could be German, 
and only German, by one of two routes: through German nationality 
 
 45.  Id. art. 14. 
 46.  Spiro, A New International Law of Citizenship, supra note 35, at 734. 
 47.  Id. 
 48.  Joachim K. Blatter et al., Acceptance of Dual Citizenship: Empirical Data and Political 
Contexts 4 (Univ. of Lucerne Inst. of Political Sci., Working Paper Series, “Glocal Governance and 
Democracy,” No. 02, 2009), http://www.alexandria.unisg.ch/EXPORT/DL/51171.pdf. 
 49.  Id. at 3. 
 50.  Id. at 10. 
 51.  Id. at 56–65 (noting that the EU States that fully recognized dual citizenship as of 2009 
include Bulgaria, Cyprus, Finland, France, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, Romania, 
Slovakia, Slovenia, Sweden and the United Kingdom). 
 52.  Considerable Interest Seen in Latvian Dual Citizenship, BALTIC COURSE (Sept. 24, 2013), 
http://www.baltic-course.com/eng/legislation/?doc=81026. 
 53.  Lithuania’s Seimas Backs Proposal to Hold Dual Citizenship Referendum, BALTIC COURSE 
(May 5, 2015), http://www.baltic-course.com/eng/legislation/?doc=105762. 
 54.  Spiro, A New International Law of Citizenship, supra note 35, at 736 n.294. 
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(Staatsangehörigkeit), or by being a member of the German Volk residing 
outside of Germany but with family origins from within its territory 
(Volkszugehörigkeit).55 But by 1999, Germany had gone through decades 
of significant mass migrations, especially from Turkey, filling the country 
with “a large population of second- and third-generation non-nationals 
excluded from the political community, and to the ever-burgeoning 
requirements of European integration.”56 Thus, in its 1999 reform, 
Germany created numerous statutory exceptions to its previous law 
requiring that one relinquish all former nationalities before naturalizing as a 
German.57 Germany’s progression since its 1999 reform reveals a stark 
change: between 2000 and 2008, over half of all naturalizing Germans 
were allowed to retain their former nationalities through one of these 
exceptions.58 
Germany additionally had in place a specific limitation to dual 
citizenship, called the Optionspflicht, which made first-generation German 
nationals who obtained nationality through jus soli (introduced in the 1999 
reform) choose before their twenty-third birthday the nationality they 
would prefer to keep: German or another nationality of their parents.59 
However, in December 2014, a new law took effect stating that young 
Germans no longer had to choose. Under the new law—estimated by 
German Integration Commissioner Aydan Özoguz, herself of Turkish 
descent, to impact half a million young people in Germany—a child can 
maintain dual citizenship, so long as by his or her twenty-first birthday the 
child had resided in Germany for eight years and had either been schooled 
or received vocational training there for at least six years.60 Thus, a nation 
that merely forty years ago called dual citizenship an “evil” has evolved to 
now permit “outsiders” to maintain their foreign nationalities and be 
concurrently German. 
Whereas earlier generations considered dual citizenship a “moral 
abomination,” in today’s world, nineteen out of the top twenty countries for 
 
 55.  Enikő Horváth & Ruth Rubio-Marín, “Alles oder Nichts”? The Outer Boundaries of the 
German Citizenship Debate, 8 INT’L. J. CONST. L. 72, 75 (2010). 
 56.  Id. at 78. 
 57.  Id. at 79. 
 58.  Id. See also Susanne Worbs, Die Einbürgerung von Ausländern in Deutschland 26 
(Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge, Working Paper No. 17, 2008), http://www.bamf.de/ 
SharedDocs/Anlagen/DE/Publikationen/WorkingPapers/wp17-
einbuergerung.pdf?__blob=publicationFile. 
 59.  Id. at 80. 
 60.  Naomi Conrad, Dual Citizenship Law Takes Effect in Germany, DEUTSCHE WELLE (Dec. 19, 
2014), http://www.dw.de/dual-citizenship-law-takes-effect-in-germany/a-18143002. The law, however, 
is not retroactive, and those who had to decide previously do not now get to retain dual citizenship. Id. 
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naturalization at least tolerate dual citizenship.61 As Professor Peter Spiro 
explains, “[d]ual citizenship is an irreversible incident of globalization. Its 
acceptance appropriately recognizes multiple national identities in a more 
mobile world.”62  
B. Transnational Europe 
The aftermath of the Second World War left Europe in a state of 
turmoil. For the prior decade, and for the second time in two consecutive 
generations, the continent was pitted against itself. In the following years, 
however, Western Europe came together and formed a so-called 
“community” of nations, which later became the European Union. In the 
seventy years since the last World War, Europe has taken unbelievable 
strides, combining East and West in the now twenty-eight nation European 
Union. Crucial to EU unity is the EU’s guarantee to its citizens of free 
movement. Combining the EU freedom of movement with the acceptance 
of dual citizenship is where we begin to understand how immigrants are 
benefiting from this concomitance to make use of the transnational 
continent. 
1.  The European Union and EU Citizenship 
The European Union has its origins in the European Coal and Steel 
Community, an economic alliance between a mere six countries—Belgium, 
France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands—that began in 
the 1950s.63 With the 1957 Treaty of Rome, the “common market” 
European Economic Community (EEC) was created.64 The modern name 
of the European Union eventually came into being in 1992, with the 
Maastricht Treaty, which called for a “common market and an economic 
and monetary union” between the European nations.65 
One of the key provisions of the Maastricht Treaty is its creation of a 
citizenship of the Union. The Treaty’s provision, codified in the Treaty on 
the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), proclaimed: “Citizenship 
of the Union is hereby established. Every person holding the nationality of 
 
 61.  Peter J. Spiro, Op-Ed., The Evolving Acceptance of Dual Citizenship, L.A. TIMES (Oct. 29, 
2014), http://www.latimes.com/opinion/op-ed/la-oe-spiro-dual-citizenship-advantages-20141030-story. 
html. 
 62.  Peter J. Spiro, Op-Ed., Dual Citizenship: As It Should Be, N.Y. TIMES (July 18, 2012), http:/ 
/www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2012/05/14/can-dual-citizens-be-good-americans/dual-citizenship-
as-it-should-be. 
 63.  The History of the European Union, EUR. UNION, http://europa.eu/about-eu/eu-history/ 
index_en.htm#40 (last visited Mar. 16, 2015). 
 64.  Id. 
 65.  Treaty on European Union, art. G(2), Feb. 7, 1992, 1992 O.J. (C 191) 1. 
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a Member State shall be a citizen of the Union. Citizenship of the Union 
shall be additional to and not replace national citizenship.”66 TFEU Article 
20(2) lays out the four components of the newly defined European 
Citizenship, the most visible of which is that all EU citizens have the right 
to move and reside freely within the entire Union.67 
At first, certain scholars considered EU citizenship “invented as a 
status without clear contents and which is an open-ended concept 
strengthened by the presumption of being fundamental.”68 Member states 
cautiously looked upon EU citizenship as something additional, not as a 
replacement for national citizenship.69 This new concept was a “naked 
European citizenship,” a citizenship that was “divested of all the 
surrounding majestic discourses, . . . a skinny legal construct, which 
operates by grafting the logic of membership onto a limited set of 
economic and labor rights in the European market.”70 Since its 
introduction, however, the Court of Justice of the European Union, among 
others, has further legitimized European citizenship by developing case law 
to establish such citizenship as a “fundamental status” of European Union 
law.71 
2.  Guaranteed Freedom of Movement 
The origin of the European freedom of movement and residence 
comes from the treaties founding the EEC in the 1950s, which included the 
freedom of movement of qualified industrial workers among the six 
 
 66.  Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, art. 20(1) 25 Mar. 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 3, 4 
Eur. Y.B. 412. 
 67.  Id. art. 20(2). The additional components include the right to vote for and stand as candidates 
in European Parliament and municipal elections, the right to be protected by diplomatic and consular 
authorities of any EU country, and the right to petition to the European Parliament and apply to the 
European Ombudsman. Id. 
 68.  KRISTĪNE KRŪMA, EU CITIZENSHIP, NATIONALITY AND MIGRANT STATUS, AN ONGOING 
CHALLENGE 127 (2014). 
 69.  Id. at 418. Jacob Weiler, a prominent international law scholar, considered EU citizenship 
especially strange: “The traditional, classical vocabulary of citizenship is the vocabulary of the State, 
the Nation and Peoplehood.” Joseph Weiler, Introduction: European Citizenship – Identity and 
Differentity, in EUROPEAN CITIZENSHIP: AN INSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGE 1, 1 (Massimo La Torre ed., 
1998). He additionally called it “little more than a cynical exercise in public relations on the part of the 
High Contracting parties.” Joseph H. H. Weiler, European Citizenship and Human Rights, in 
REFORMING THE TREATY ON EUROPEAN UNION, THE LEGAL DEBATE 57, 65 (Jan A. Winter et al. eds., 
1996). 
 70.  FRANCESCA STRUMIA, SUPRANATIONAL CITIZENSHIP AND THE CHALLENGE OF DIVERSITY: 
IMMIGRANTS, CITIZENS AND MEMBER STATES IN THE EU 2 (2013). 
 71.  KRŪMA, supra note 68, at 5–6. 
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founding nations.72 Such movement was intended for economic reasons 
only, but the scope has evolved since the 1970s. This change was due 
primarily to the European Court of Justice, which “gradually shifted policy 
from protecting primarily free movement of workers to the free movement 
of persons.”73 The Maastricht Treaty’s creation of an EU citizenry 
ultimately guaranteed this right to all through its guaranteed right of 
freedom of movement and residence.74 
Effective for all EU nations as of April 2006, EU Directive 
2004/38/EC75 codified numerous EU developments to clarify and to 
strengthen the rights of freedom of movement and residence.76 The goal of 
the Directive was thus to “create a single legislative act” with the purpose 
of “remedying this sector-by-sector, piecemeal approach to the right of free 
movement and residence.”77 
“The right to reside in another EU country is your fundamental and 
personal right . . . . This basically means that once you meet the conditions, 
you have the right to reside from that moment and your right is not granted 
to you by a decision of the host EU country.”78 To move from one EU 
country to another, all that an EU citizen needs is a national ID card or 
passport.79 No residence permits are required for EU citizens—they were 
abolished by the Directive.80 An EU citizen is guaranteed the ability to 
reside in any EU country for three months without any conditions other 
than having an identity card or passport,81 and if the EU citizen is seeking 
employment and has a genuine chance of finding work, the citizen can stay 
six months,82 or even longer.83 After the first three months, if a citizen is 
 
 72.  Saara Koikkalainen, Free Movement in Europe: Past and Present, MIGRATION POL’Y INST. 
(Apr. 21, 2011), http://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/free-movement-europe-past-and-present. 
 73.  Id. 
 74.  TFEU, supra note 66, art. 20(2). 
 75.  Directive 2004/38/EC, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on the 
Right of Citizens of the Union and their Family Members to Move and Reside Freely within the 
Territory of the Member States Amending Regulation (EEC) No. 1612/68 and Repealing Directives 
64/221/EEC, 68/360/EEC, 72/194/EEC, 73/148/EEC, 75/34/EEC, 75/35/EEC, 90/364/EEC, 
90/365/EEC and 93/96/EED, 2004 O.J. (L 158) 77 [hereinafter Directive 2004/38/EC]. 
 76.  Id. pmbl. (3). 
 77.  Id. pmbl. (4). 
 78.  EUR. COMM’N, FREEDOM TO MOVE AND LIVE IN EUROPE: A GUIDE TO YOUR RIGHTS AS AN 
EU CITIZEN 16 (2013), http://ec.europa.eu/justice/citizen/document/files/guide-free-mo-2013_en.pdf 
[hereinafter EU FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT GUIDE]. 
 79.  Directive 2004/38/EC, supra note 75, art. 5(1). 
 80.  EU FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT GUIDE, supra note 78, at 18. However, family members who 
are not EU citizens will have a residence card that shows their family relationship to an EU citizen. 
Directive 2004/38/EC, supra note 75, art. 9(1). 
 81.  Directive 2004/38/EC, supra note 75, art. 6(1). 
 82.  Id. art. 7(3)(c). 
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working (including self-employment) in the new EU country, then the 
citizen “ha[s] the right to reside without any conditions other than being a 
worker or self-employed person.”84 Students also retain this right, as long 
as they continue to be enrolled in an educational establishment following a 
course of study or vocational training (plus maintaining insurance and 
sufficient financial resources).85 Even if a citizen is expelled because the 
citizen failed to keep up with the minimal requirements of the freedom of 
movement, barring extreme circumstances, the citizen is free to return to 
that country as long as the post-three-month requirements are satisfied.86 
Not only do EU citizens have the right to free movement, but so do 
their family members, even if they are not nationals of any EU member 
state.87 This includes one’s spouse, registered partner, descendants 
(children, grandchildren, etc.), and ascendants (parents, grandparents, 
etc.).88 As long as the citizen continues to meet his or her conditions, family 
members have the right to reside with the citizen in that country.89 And 
even if the EU citizen dies, the citizen’s non-EU family members will 
generally be allowed to remain, as long as they had been in the country for 
a year prior to the individual’s death.90 
The EU’s freedom of movement has been deemed “one of the most 
visible and cherished advantages of the European Union for individual 
citizens.”91 A public opinion poll taken by the European Commission 
asking Europeans what the EU meant to them found that the freedom to 
travel, study and work anywhere in the EU was the most important 
consideration, ranked number one in a long list including the Euro, peace, 
and democracy.92 Similarly, fifty-six percent of European citizens found 
freedom of movement to be the most positive achievement of the EU.93 
According to the European Commission, EU citizens make more than one 
 
 83.  EU FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT GUIDE, supra note 78, at 13. 
 84.  Id. at 15; see Directive 2004/38/EC, supra note 75, art. 7(1)(a). 
 85.  Directive 2004/38/EC, supra note 75, art. 7(1)(c). 
 86.  EU FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT GUIDE, supra note 78, at 22. 
 87.  Directive 2004/38/EC, supra note 75, art. 6(2). 
 88.  Id. art. 2(2). 
 89.  Id. art. 7(2). 
 90.  Id. art. 12. 
 91.  EU FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT GUIDE, supra note 78, at 5. 
 92.  Public Opinion in the European Union, STANDARD EUROBAROMETER, Spring 2013 at 1, 64. 
 93.  Eur. Comm’n, Commc’n from the Comm’n to the Eur. Parliament, the Council, the Eur. 
Econ. & Soc. Comm. and the Comm. of the Regions, Free Movement of EU Citizens and their 
Families: Five Actions to Make a Difference, art. 1.1, COM (2013) 837 final (Nov. 25, 2013) 
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billion trips between the EU countries every year,94 and at the end of 2012, 
14.1 million European citizens were residing in other member states.95 
3.  The European Union’s Eastward Expansion 
Until 2004, the European Union remained a “club” of fifteen nations 
from Western Europe.96 In that year, ten new nations were added from the 
former Soviet Bloc in the single largest expansion of the European Union.97 
In May 2004, the EU’s population increased by twenty-eight percent to 
more than five hundred million individuals with the accession of the Czech 
Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovenia and 
Slovakia (as well as Malta and Cyprus).98 Since then, three more Eastern 
nations—Bulgaria, Romania, and Croatia—have joined the EU, expanding 
the Union to its current twenty-eight nation membership. 
With the expansion of the EU, the effects of the freedom of movement 
have grown substantially. One reason for this is the grave difference in 
wealth between Eastern and Western Europe, which many expected to 
cause mass migrations.99 Thus, a transitional period was put in place to 
quell such migratory patterns,100 but by 2011, all 2004 entrants had full 
guarantees across the EU, and the same was established for Romanian and 
Bulgarian citizens in January 2014.101 
As expected, many Eastern Europeans flocked west. A study by the 
University of Oxford’s Migration Observatory highlighted the impact on 
the United Kingdom. The group found that whereas between 1991 and 
2004, the amount of EU citizens migrating to the United Kingdom hovered 
around 50,000 individuals, upon the accession to the Union of the Eastern 
nations, that number jumped by 100,000 persons annually, with the number 
in 2010 being just over 150,000 EU citizens migrating to the United 
 
 94.  EU FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT GUIDE, supra note 78, at 5. 
 95.  EC Free Movement Report, supra note 93, art. 1.2. 
 96.  SAMANTHA CURRIE, MIGRATION, WORK AND CITIZENSHIP IN THE ENLARGED EUROPEAN 
UNION 1 (2008). 
 97.  Id. 
 98.  Id. 
 99.  Koikkalainen, supra note 72. For instance, in 2003, Latvian citizens, as nationals of the 
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original fifteen member states. Id. 
 100.  In order to ameliorate concerns regarding a rapid influx of immigration from the eastern 
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Kingdom.102 Meanwhile, the countries with the lowest net stock of EU 
migrants were Poland and Romania, sending out, respectively, about 1.5 
and 2 million citizens more than they were receiving.103 And the Eastern 
European countries have felt this impact. For example, between 2004 and 
2007, around two million Poles were “temporarily residing” in other EU 
member states, amounting to more than five percent of the nation’s 
population.104 
Thus, the combination of the European Union’s eastward expansion in 
the beginning of the twenty-first century and the EU’s guarantee that 
citizens can move and reside freely in any EU nation has expanded the 
scope of a transnational Europe. As a result, outsiders have access to a 
much larger territory than previously imagined. 
III.  BIRTHRIGHT CITIZENSHIP 
Both the acceptance of dual citizenship and the transnationalization of 
Europe are twenty-first century phenomena. These concurrent 
developments have brought forth a novel externality upon the European 
Union: outsiders can now gain EU citizenship without giving up their own 
nationalities. And they can move freely between all the countries once 
citizenship has been achieved. Thus, the desirability of being an EU 
national has increased significantly. 
EU citizenship is determined by the citizenship laws of individual 
member states. This signifies that each EU nation still has the right to 
determine its own laws regarding who can become a citizen of that country. 
This Part analyzes individual member states’ birthright-based citizenship 
laws and addresses the domestic legal frameworks through which 
individuals have been able to take advantage of their heritage to gain access 
to the EU’s benefits. 
A. Citizenship Through Ethnicity and Heritage 
Every country in Europe has some degree of a jus sanguinis principle 
embedded in its citizenship laws.105 But within the model of citizenship 
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 104.  Koikkalainen, supra note 72. 
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through descent, there are significant variations between the approaches 
different countries take. The first category is the simplest and purest form 
of jus sanguinis: if a child is born to a citizen of a nation, that child is a 
citizen of that nation. The second category takes the pure form and includes 
a residency and/or birth requirement, mandating some physical connection 
through birth or residence to the homeland. And a third category seeks to 
incorporate a nation’s diaspora through two different approaches: those 
targeting an ethnic diaspora, and those targeting a colonial diaspora. 
The first division found in jus sanguinis laws in Europe is a 
differentiation between birth in a country and birth abroad. The purest jus 
sanguinis models are those that do not differentiate. Many European 
countries have such provisions, which are incredibly simple and 
straightforward. In France, for example, “[a] child is French if one of the 
child’s parents is French.”106 However, many others differentiate between 
children born in the country and those born abroad. Whereas birth within a 
country to citizens of that country will result in automatic nationality, when 
a child is born abroad, nations often mandate registration of the child 
within a certain number of years in order to make that child a citizen of the 
parents’ country of origin.107 For example, Germany’s new citizenship law 
states that persons born abroad to citizens who had been born abroad on or 
after January 1, 2000, and residing abroad, must be registered within the 
first year of the child’s life; otherwise, the child will lose German 
citizenship.108 
Such abroad-based nationality laws have grown especially complex, 
as evidenced by Belgium’s birthright citizenship regime. A person born 
before 1967 is a Belgian citizen from birth if that person is the legitimate 
child of a father (only) who was a Belgian citizen.109 Someone born 
between 1967 and 1984 is a Belgian citizen if the previous conditions were 
met before 1985 (i.e., being legitimated or being acknowledged by a 
Belgian citizen after being born out of wedlock), or if the option listed next 
is met, making that person a citizen only as upon January 1, 1985.110 If a 
 
 106.  CODE CIVIL [C. CIV.] art. 18 (Fr.). 
 107.  See Comparing Citizenship Laws: Acquisition of Citizenship, Database, EUR. UNION 
DEMOCRACY OBSERVATORY ON CITIZENSHIP, http://eudo-citizenship.eu/databases/modes-of-
acquisition (last visited Mar. 17, 2015) (listing systematically the twenty-seven ways in which an 
individual can acquire citizenship, including children who are born both in a country and abroad). 
 108.  Staatsangehörigkeitsgesetz [StAG] [Nationality Act], July 22, 1913, as amended, 
BUNDESGESETZBLATT, Teil I [BGBL. I] at 1802, § 4(4) (Ger.). 
 109.  Born to a Belgian Parent, KINGDOM OF BELG.: FOREIGN AFFAIRS, FOREIGN TRADE & DEV. 
COOPERATION, http://diplomatie.belgium.be/en/services/services_abroad/nationality/ being_granted_ 
belgian_nationality/born_to_a_belgian_parent (last visited Mar. 17, 2015). 
 110.  Id. 
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child was born after January 1, 1985, then the child would only become 
Belgian if born in Belgium to a Belgian parent, or if born abroad, either (1) 
the child had a Belgian parent born in a Belgian territory before 1960 or 
1962 (depending on the territory), (2) the Belgian parent was born abroad 
and makes a declaration within five years of the child’s birth requesting a 
grant of Belgian nationality, or (3) under the previous option, a child’s 
Belgian parent failed to submit the declaration, and that child has thus 
become stateless.111 This tedious progression emphasizes the increasing 
steps certain nations have been taking to reduce the continuity of their 
citizenship by those abroad. This is presumably because citizenship, as 
emphasized in Part I, contains a link to the nation and carries with it a set of 
duties and obligations. As generations move abroad, it is increasingly 
unlikely that those descendants will be able to maintain such obligations 
towards a country far away. 
Nonetheless, many European countries—often to the south and east, 
perhaps suggesting a correlation to domestic fiscal and labor needs—have 
chosen an approach opposite to Belgium, in which they attempt to connect 
with their diasporas abroad. The most meaningful citizenship laws for the 
purpose of today’s transnational EU citizens are those based not on one’s 
parents’ nationalities, but rather on one’s heritage. One of the clearest and 
most lenient examples comes from Ireland. The Irish Nationality and 
Citizen Act states that a person can be naturalized “where the applicant is 
of Irish descent or Irish associations.”112 Having “Irish associations” is 
defined as being “related by blood, affinity or adoption to a person” who is 
presently an Irish citizen, or who is deceased and was at the time of death 
an Irish citizen, or entitled to have been one.113 In practice, this generally 
means that anyone (and their relatives) with a parent or grandparent born in 
Ireland can acquire Irish citizenship,114 although once a person acquires 
Irish citizenship, the chain can potentially restart and continue to future 
generations, based on the individual’s circumstances.115 Some newer EU 
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 112.  Irish Nationality and Citizenship Act 1956 (Act No. 26/1956), art. 16(a). 
 113.  Id. art. 16(2). 
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states appear even more lenient. In Croatia, up to great-grandchildren (and 
their spouses) of a Croatian emigrant are permitted to obtain Croatian 
citizenship,116 while the broadest of all seems to be Bulgaria, whose law 
simply states that a person of Bulgarian origin can be naturalized as a 
Bulgarian.117 
The last traditional category of citizenship law is that which reaches 
out to a country’s colonial diaspora. Spain’s laws are illustrative.118 As 
early as 1951, Spain passed a law allowing dual nationality agreements 
with Latin American countries, and by 1969, Spain—still a military 
dictatorship—had exempted Latin American and Filipino immigrants from 
getting work permits, giving them access to social rights enjoyed only by 
Spanish citizens.119 And while typical non-EU aliens must reside in Spain 
for ten years before naturalization, those from Latin America and the 
Philippines are subject to only a two-year residency requirement.120 Much 
of this is believed to be a result of Francisco Franco’s push for global 
connections based on a “romantic recognition of hispanidad,” and that as a 
result, “state officials assumed that Spain had . . . a ‘spiritual mission’ to 
make these linkages and preferences.”121 This seems to have been the 
general consideration across Europe regarding its diaspora populations: 
according to Skrentny et al., whereas in Asia ethnic preferences had often 
been seen as a motive tied to economic benefits, in Europe the extension to 
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 116.  Zakon o hrvatskom državljanstvu (Law on Croatian Citizenship), June 26, 1991, art. 11. 
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attended at least five years of school that was taught in French. Id. 
 119.  John Skrentny et al., Defining Nations in Asia and Europe: A Comparative Analysis of Ethnic 
Return Migration Policy, in DIASPORIC HOMECOMINGS: ETHNIC RETURN MIGRATION IN COMPARATIVE 
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 121.  Skrentny et al., supra note 119, at 61. 
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the diaspora has always appeared, at least outwardly, to be something more 
romantic.122 
B. Restitution Citizenship 
Since the Second World War, an increasing number of citizenship 
laws have been based on the principle of restitution.123 In other words, 
countries are passing laws that target a specific historic wrong against a 
specific group and permit that group to once again attain citizenship of its 
former nation. Two categories of restitution-based citizenship laws have 
come into place. The first category regards a historical injustice done by 
others. Although claimed as an act by “others,” in practice, this is often a 
government’s somewhat misleading phraseology of giving citizenship to 
those who lost it in the past because the country had lost territory—“on 
account of others”—through a war. Conversely, the second category 
regards historical injustices by one’s own state, causing a group of its 
population to be ousted. As becomes evident, the second category has 
extended to laws that are much more remote and unpredictable as time goes 
on. 
Germany appears to be the first country to have enacted modern 
legislation for restitution. Ethnic Germans had for centuries lived in 
countries east of modern-day Germany.124 After the Second World War, 
due to anti-Nazi and anti-German sentiments, about 12.5 million ethnic 
Germans were driven out of or fled their homes in Eastern Europe and the 
Soviet Union. Although almost eight million of them were able to enter 
West Germany by 1949, 3.5 million ethnic Germans were trapped in the 
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East.125 As a result, Germany passed Article 116(1) of its Basic Law to 
provide its Aussiedler (“out-settler”) population a right to naturalization, 
and with it, the ability to return and resettle in Germany.126 The language of 
Article 116(1) grants the right of return to Vertriebener (“expellees”),127 
which was codified to include those facing some sort of expulsion or 
pressure in Eastern European nations.128 A 1953 statute then extended the 
interpretation of 116(1) beyond Eastern Europe to “whoever in their 
homeland has acknowledged German nationality and can confirm it 
through characteristics like parentage, language, upbringing or culture.”129 
Between 1950 and 1998, almost four million ethnic Germans returned to 
Germany through Article 116(1).130 
A more recent development has occurred in Hungary, where, in 2010, 
the country amended its Citizenship Act to permit ethnic Hungarians living 
abroad with knowledge of the Hungarian language to acquire Hungarian 
citizenship.131 This act targeted ethnic Hungarians residing in neighboring 
Romania, Slovakia, Serbia and Ukraine, where large portions of those 
nations’ territories were once part of the Kingdom of Hungary before the 
First World War. Such legislation thus gave ethnic Hungarians the 
opportunity to re-nationalize as Hungarians.132 
The previous examples emphasize new citizenship based on supposed 
injustices of others. The alternative category of birthright citizenship laws 
is that which is based on the injustices of the individual’s own government. 
The first example comes, again, from Germany’s Basic Law Article 116, 
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the second provision of which permits the renaturalization of Jews 
persecuted in Germany between 1933 and 1945.133 The largest group of 
claims originates from the “Eleventh Decree to the Law on Citizenship of 
the Reich,” passed on November 25, 1941, which stated that Jews living 
outside Germany could no longer be German citizens.134 To re-obtain 
German citizenship, there is a simple two-page form that former German 
Jews or their descendants are required to fill out. In addition, the family 
must merely supply vital records of the person born in Germany and 
establish the familial link to applying descendants.135 
Similarly, Spain has taken a few recent steps to come to terms with 
aspects of its own difficult past. In 2007, Spain passed the Historical 
Memory Law targeting its Spanish diaspora.136 For the period of 2008 to 
2011, descendants abroad could claim Spanish citizenship if a parent was 
Spanish by birth or if a grandparent lost or was forced to renounce Spanish 
nationality after being exiled by the Franco regime.137 In the mere four-year 
window of availability, about 503,000 requests for Spanish citizenship 
were submitted, of which ninety percent came from Latin America.138 As of 
the beginning of 2014, about 300,000 of the applications for citizenship had 
been approved.139 
Lastly, Spain and Portugal have recently taken the concept of 
restitution citizenship a few steps further by announcing plans to grant 
citizenship (and permit dual citizenship) to descendants of Jewish families 
who were expelled from the Iberian Peninsula during the Inquisition in the 
late fifteenth century. In November 2012, 520 years after the Jews of Spain 
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had been expelled, Spain announced an attempt to finally “redress the 
injustice” by granting citizenship through an expedited process to such 
Jewish descendants.140 There were concerns at the time that Spain would 
continue its policy of demanding forfeiture of foreign citizenships,141 but 
the clause was eventually dropped in 2014.142 The bill was approved by the 
Spanish government in June 2015 and took effect in October 2015.143 Spain 
is implementing numerous limitations on the bill: applicants must (1) be 
certified by the Spanish Federation of Jewish Communities, (2) prove their 
Sephardic connection and connection to the Ladino language, (3) speak 
Spanish, and (4) show affiliation to Spain by passing a Spanish history test 
or by supporting Spanish charities.144 Even with such limitations, Spain 
expects up to 200,000 Sephardic Jews to apply for citizenship upon the 
law’s enactment.145 
In January 2015, Portugal followed Spain’s lead, when its Cabinet 
approved a law to offer dual citizenship to descendants of Sephardic 
Jews.146 Portugal, who claims its sole purpose of granting citizenship is to 
“redress a historic wrong,” laid out standards similar to Spain for 
descendants to meet, such as demonstrating “a traditional connection” 
through “family names, family language, and direct or collateral ancestry” 
to the Portuguese Sephardic Community.147 These Spanish and Portuguese 
requirements are most likely an attempt to quell concerns that Jews (or 
even non-Jews) without the lasting Sephardic connection would try to take 
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advantage of these citizenship laws148—Joshua Weitz, a biologist at 
Georgia Tech University, has claimed that all of today’s global Jewish 
population has at least one ancestor from Spain,149 and the same might be 
said for neighboring Portugal as well. Nonetheless, between the end of 
January and the beginning of March 2015, more than five thousand 
descendants contacted the Jewish Community of Oporto, Portugal to 
enquire into the new law.150 After the first month, the first twenty-one 
applicants—residing in nations as diverse as China, Australia and 
Panama—were already approved for citizenship.151 
As these examples reveal, it has become quite alluring for people to 
begin looking into their heritage in order to determine whether some 
ancestor was linked to Europe. It should, therefore, come as no surprise that 
a growing number of websites have started to publicize the topic and its 
economic and financial benefits. For instance, one site’s catchy headline 
reads, “Great-Grandpa May Hold Your Key to EU Citizenship.” As the 
webpage begins, “[a]fter all these years, could your great-great-great-
grandparents (may they rest in peace) be about to hand you citizenship in 
Hungary, and, with it, the legal freedom to live and do business in any of 
the 27 countries of the European Union?”152 The incentive is evident. And 
one does not have much to do in order to earn such a right; one simply has 
to thank his forebears. 
IV.  BIRTHRIGHT CITIZENS OF THE EUROPEAN UNION 
Who are the new players taking advantage of this timely 
phenomenon? They are individuals who generally share three 
characteristics. First, they are non-EU residents. Second, they have some 
historical link to an EU member state. Third, they (a) reside in one country, 
and (b) have a hereditary link to another country, both of which recognize 
dual citizenship. The people who satisfy these three elements are able to 
gain entry into the EU workforce, schools and tax system by doing nothing 
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more than claiming and proving a historical link that they possess by 
chance. 
Logically, the vast majority of people that can satisfy these three 
conditions will be located in countries where European nations developed 
strong colonial ties, and to which Europeans continued to immigrate. One 
of the most evident is the United States, the melting pot nation, where more 
than half of the population claimed on the 2000 census to have ancestry 
from a European country.153 Similar high ratios are found in Canada, where 
two thirds of the population identified as having European ancestry;154 
Australia’s estimate has even been seen as high as eighty-five percent.155 
Latin America also plays a prominent role, not only because of its 
traditional colonial European heritage with Spain and Portugal, but also 
because of twentieth century developments that drew other Europeans to 
Latin America as well.156 
The nation that gives us the best case study in understanding this new 
phenomenon, however, is Israel: as of 2010, about 344,000 Israelis living 
in Israel had dual citizenship with an EU nation.157 Given that dense 
population of dual citizens, Princeton graduate student Yossi Harpaz, with 
the help of Tel Aviv University, was able to conduct a widespread survey 
of the justifications behind such numbers. Through this in-depth survey of 
Israelis, which generally correlates to the other diaspora communities, the 
rationale for acquiring an EU passport comes to light. 
Foremost, individuals are gaining EU passports for economic 
advantages. Based on his research, Harpaz listed five economic reasons 
why Israelis are obtaining second passports, the majority of which can be 
applied cross-border: (1) the EU freedom of movement, (2) access to 
European universities with the potential for reduced tuition, (3) facilitated 
access to the United States through its Visa Waiver Program, and to certain 
Arab countries that will not let in Israelis, (4) eligibility to purchase real 
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estate in certain countries that restrict such activities to citizens, and (5) to 
facilitate claims for restitution of property in connection with the Second 
World War.158 
Recent surges in passport applications highlight the clear economic 
value of EU citizenship because of its freedom of movement. As one 
Shoshana in Israel stated, around 2000 she decided to look into getting 
Hungarian passports based on ancestry for herself and her three children.159 
Hungary joined the EU in 2004, and “[i]t was then that people started 
talking about the European Union. And we thought it’s a good idea: if we 
have a European passport, then the kids can study, work, whatever they 
want. We’ll open up new horizons for them.”160 Such a mentality has been 
seen elsewhere. Suzanne Mulvehill of Lake Worth, Florida, whose mother 
was born in Romania, similarly explained: 
 
With an EU passport, I can live and work in 27 countries. . . . With a 
U.S. passport, I can live and work in one. . . . I recognized for the first 
time in my life that being American had its limits . . . and that if I really 
wanted to become what I call a global citizen, then I needed to tap into 
all my resources to expand my ability to serve entrepreneurs not just in 
Lake Worth, which is one town, and not just in Florida or in America or 
in North America, but the globe.161 
 
Similarly, James Harlow, a Californian descendant of Sephardic Jews 
intended to apply for Portuguese citizenship because his Silicon Valley 
business has been trying to expand abroad; EU citizenship “offers an entry 
into a huge market.”162 
The extension of the EU to Eastern Europe has made these benefits 
valuable to a far greater number of individuals. For instance, South 
American billionaire Germán Efromovich, owner of Colombia’s national 
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airline Avianca, wanted to buy Portugal’s largest airline, TAP. However, 
he ran into a problem with European corporate law, which limits a non-EU 
citizen’s investment stake of an airline company to forty-nine percent.163 
Conveniently for Efromovich, his parents were born in Poland before 
fleeing to South America.164 As the son of Polish immigrants, he was able 
to take advantage of Poland’s heritage laws and become a Polish citizen.165 
Although he ultimately lost his bid to purchase TAP, Efromovich has 
pursued numerous other ventures in Europe, including potential stakes in 
Italy’s Alitalia and Poland’s LOT Airlines, stating that he “must boost the 
presence of [his] airlines in Europe.”166 None of this would be possible 
without the EU’s eastward expansion, Poland’s birthright citizenship laws, 
international acceptance of dual nationality, and the benefits of EU 
citizenship, all of which are necessary—and none of which are sufficient—
for such European business ventures. 
The number of people applying for second passports is significant. In 
the four years that descendants of Spaniards exiled during the Franco 
regime could apply for passports between 2008 and 2011, more than half a 
million individuals applied for passports, of which over 300,000 have 
already been approved.167 And in the decade since Eastern Europe’s 
accession to the EU, about 60,000 Israelis have applied for citizenship from 
those countries,168 while 100,000 Israelis maintain dual German 
citizenship.169 Similarly, during the first three months that Latvia allowed 
dual citizenship at the end of 2013, over 1,300 individuals applied, the 
largest numbers coming from the United States, Canada, Australia, Russia 
and Israel.170 Lastly, between the end of January and the beginning of 
March 2015, over five thousand descendants globally had contacted the 
Portuguese Jewish Community regarding Portugal’s new Inquisition law.171 
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Thus a clear trend comes to light: people are taking advantage of the EU’s 
freedom of movement and evolving citizenship laws to gain a second 
passport. 
Many view these second passports as a type of insurance policy, 
giving their families the comfort of knowing that if the political or 
economic situations in their countries of residence worsen, they have the 
ability to go elsewhere.172 Yet, as Daniel Garcia of Argentina explained, 
especially because of Spain’s questionable economy, “[f]or now I am 
staying here. . . . I am doing it to be able to travel and to have the 
passport.”173 
Most significantly, many are accumulating such nationalities not to 
return to their ancestral homeland, but to go to neighboring countries. Take 
Sebastian, an Argentine who acquired Estonian citizenship because his 
grandfather had been born there. He did it for access to the European 
Union. Meanwhile, “it does feel strange being Estonian. He doesn’t speak 
the language, has never been to Tallinn and knows little about the Baltic 
state’s history or customs.”174 In a similar situation is Liz Fink, a Ph.D. 
student in French history at New York University, who received German 
citizenship through her grandfather so that she could live in Paris: “It’s 
funny, but I got German citizenship to live in France.”175 
Such results were confirmed in the Israeli study on dual citizens, 
which found that such EU citizens “did not see themselves as German, 
Polish, or Hungarian in any way, as reflected in respondents’ insistence that 
they were ‘100 percent Israeli.’”176 As one interviewee explained, “the 
Israeli passport reflects my citizenship and my identity, the European 
passport is just for practical use.”177 As a result, there is an absence of any 
allegiance to that European nation: “Israelis with citizenship in Central and 
Eastern European countries typically exhibited no interest in political 
engagement with their external states, neither as voters from abroad nor as 
an ‘ethnic lobby’ in Israel.”178 As of 2012, fifty-five percent of Israelis 
applying for Polish citizenship were the grandchildren of the Polish 
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national.179 Meanwhile ninety-five percent of the applicants did not speak 
any Polish, and “[m]ost applicants admit that they do not seek to immigrate 
to Warsaw, but hope to become citizens of the EU.”180 
How many people actually move to Europe once they have their 
second passport? Considering how new this phenomenon is—most 
countries’ citizenship changes have occurred within the past five to ten 
years—very little information is available. Nonetheless, two small 
examples give us a hint that this is a growing phenomenon. First, in Spain, 
where Latin Americans receive preferential treatment for naturalization 
based on their shared history of hispanidad (only two years of residence in 
Spain to become a citizen as opposed to ten years for non-Hispanics181), 
there has been a significant influx: between 2004 and 2012, over half a 
million Latin Americans went to Spain and received citizenship by residing 
there for two years.182 As a second example, an estimated 15,000 Israelis 
have emigrated to live in Berlin alone.183 From these small samples, it is 
not possible to clearly analyze the scope of immigrants gaining second 
passports and actually moving to Europe; it is simply too early to tell what 
many of the new law’s impacts will be. This study is particularly 
challenging because, once in Europe, these individuals are presumably 
using their European passports, and are, therefore, being monitored simply 
as fellow Europeans—the data will not necessarily reflect that they are 
outsiders. Nonetheless, this is clearly a growing trend that warrants further 
statistical research over the next decade as the different laws gain effect 
and popularity. 
V. ASSESSING BIRTHRIGHT CITIZENSHIP ACROSS AN 
EVOLVING EUROPE 
A few concerns are raised when considering these new citizens of the 
European Union. First, they highlight the unpredictability of individual 
countries’ laws and their unforeseen, potentially negative, consequences. 
Second, this new brand of birthright citizenship challenges the traditional 
understanding of ethnic return migration—that people return to the country 
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of their ancestry and remain in that country. This Part thus provides 
suggestions to the EU aimed at ameliorating such uncertainty. The EU 
should, first, study this phenomenon to determine whether a uniform policy 
regarding birthright citizenship legislation is needed. This additional 
research will bring to light the benefits and risks of these developments. If 
the risks appear to outweigh the benefits, EU nations should limit the use of 
reparation citizenship laws, limiting them—if maintaining them at all—to 
recent “wrongs.” 
A. Tackling Inconsistency Across the European Union 
There is no unitary policy on citizenship for the European Union, and 
as a result each nation is free to enact its own citizenship regime. As 
demonstrated in Part III, divergent outcomes across the EU have resulted. 
With the inclusion of the freedom of movement in EU citizenship, nations 
have lost control over the persons gaining entry due to EU citizenship from 
another country, a country whose policies may not be approved in their 
new country of residence. An example comes from the United Kingdom, 
where “[h]undreds of thousands of migrants are taking advantage of soft 
European Union rules to get jobs in Britain by the back door.”184 Between 
2004 and 2015, the number of non-Europeans with EU citizenship 
employed in Britain increased from 78,000 to 264,000, while nine percent 
of EU citizens living in the U.K. were born outside of Europe.185 Another 
example arose in Romania, where through its new birthright citizenship 
law, more than a quarter-million Moldovans were able to acquire 
Romanian citizenship.186 Moldova is not a member of the EU. As a result, 
Romania’s laws caused alarm in Western Europe, where the thought 
prevailed that regardless of Moldova being held outside of the European 
Union, more than 225,000 of its citizens now have the full right to take 
advantage of all the EU’s benefits.187 As the German newspaper Der 
Spiegel’s headline read: 
 
Romania’s president wants to increase his country’s population and is 
using an odd means to do so. The country is generously bestowing 
hundreds of thousands of Romanian passports on impoverished 
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Moldovans. They are gratefully accepting the offer from the EU member 
state and are streaming into Western Europe to work as cheap 
laborers.”188 
 
Meanwhile, certain politicians in Western Europe demanded something be 
done about the influx.189  
These results are likely not what European nations envisioned when 
enacting their birthright citizenship laws; nor were they likely anticipated 
byproducts of the EU guarantee of freedom of movement at its inception. 
In considering whether the European nations truly want such effects as are 
being received, it is worth considering another new phenomenon, the 
premise of which warrants another paper entirely: investment citizenship. 
As of now, Malta and Cyprus grant citizenship to investors who give the 
country between 800,000 and 5 million euros, depending on the 
circumstances.190 There are additional investment programs in other 
European nations, but individuals are merely granted permanent residence 
or temporary residence permits, not citizenship.191 Much of this investment 
citizenship, unsurprisingly, is a recent phenomenon that has been viewed as 
a response by struggling economies after the financial crisis to stimulate 
financial growth.192 One might argue that if countries are extending benefits 
to people without any national connection on the condition that they 
contribute investment, receiving countries should not care if new European 
citizens residing in their countries lack any affiliation to that country, so 
long as those individuals are contributing to society. But as of now, only 
two small nations grant full citizenship, and they have received significant 
pushback. For instance, in 2014, the European Parliament voted that EU 
citizenship could not have a “price tag.” The Parliament stated that 
“[o]utright sale of EU citizenship undermines the mutual trust upon which 
the Union is built,” and “Parliament also stresse[d] that the rights conferred 
by EU citizenship, such as the right to move and reside freely within the 
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EU, should not be treated as a ‘tradable commodity.’”193 Thus, it cannot be 
said that Europe as a whole is willing to tolerate such minimal connections; 
rather, it strongly suggests that European nations most likely prefer 
maintaining the personal affinities associated with traditional citizenship. 
Perhaps all of this is just a natural component of globalization. 
Christian Joppke proposes that we are moving “[b]eyond nationhood,”194 
where EU citizenship is “postnational citizenship in its most elaborate 
form.”195 Joppke suggests that we are now living in the age of “citizenship 
light,” where “[t]he future of citizenship is bound to be light, and lighter 
still with the help of ‘Europe.’”196 Nonetheless, although the framework of 
citizenship might be lightening, the implications of such migrations are not 
diminishing.  
The EU should thus work through Eurostat to understand and quantify 
the growing number of access-oriented birthright citizens. Such an analysis 
would most accurately be captured by assessing individuals who (1) were 
born outside of the EU, (2) possess citizenship to an EU nation, and (3) are 
living in an EU nation other than their nation of citizenship. If such a study 
finds the numbers significant, the EU might consider implementing a 
standardized procedure for birthright citizenship. Presently, national 
citizenship laws remain decentralized, as EU member states are reluctant to 
adopt uniform immigration policies. On the immigration front, it is 
understandable that European nations would not want a unified policy, as, 
for instance, southern EU member states have very different immigration 
concerns than those in the north. For this reason, policies regarding 
immigrant naturalization will probably remain decentralized. But in some 
areas of mutual concern (family reunification, students/researchers, and 
long-term third-country nationals) common policies have progressed.197 
Birthright citizenship is only a small piece in the puzzle, and since all 
countries are affected by each country’s birthright citizenship regime, there 
is an increased possibility that the Union could find common ground for 
agreement in this field. 
In the aftermath of the financial crisis, the number of birthright 
citizens living and moving around Europe will likely continue to grow. Yet, 
a study into this phenomenon might find that birthright citizens are actually 
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economically benefitting the EU as a whole. Many (or most) of these 
individuals are moving to Europe for the financial gain, so they will be 
contributing to the wellbeing of the Union. Meanwhile, these individuals 
might later decide to give back to the nations that gave them the 
opportunity for growth in the first place—the “other” nation whose 
passport they are using. Thus, it is plausible that the EU might find these 
laws beneficial and choose to keep them in place. Nonetheless, this Part has  
raised numerous concerns for the EU to consider, and the Union must now 
determine whether this subject warrants action. 
B. A Cause for Change? Ethnic Return Migration Without the Return 
The concept of returning to one’s “homeland” has been called ethnic 
return migration.198 And in Europe, most of the policies regarding ethnic 
returns have been outwardly based on romanticism. Europe “appeal[s] to 
blood-based kinship and the emotions that go with it,” and that appears to 
be “an end in itself.”199 Whereas in Asia, there have been economic 
justifications for such legislation, Europe has stayed away from such 
rhetoric: “European policies appear especially romantic or even irrational, 
as economic justifications are absent or muted and the policies do not 
clearly link the co-ethnics into the economy.”200 For example, although 
many question such authenticity,201 Portugal stated this year that “[l]ike 
Spain, . . . its sole reason for granting citizenship is to redress a historic 
wrong.”202 
As explained in Part IV, this new class of citizens is doing something 
new: going to countries other than the countries from which they are 
acquiring citizenship. And they often maintain no affinity to the second 
citizenship nation. The unique (and perhaps problematic) situation of such 
individuals is that they contravene what it traditionally means to be a 
citizen. According to Professor Rogers Brubaker, since the French 
Revolution, there has been a general understanding regarding the 
functionality of citizenship: (1) it is a “general membership status based on 
equality before the law;” (2) it requires “active political citizenship,” while 
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being maintained as a “general status” for all; (3) it develops “sharpened 
boundaries” between different nations; and (4) it codifies state 
membership.203 This new class of birthright citizens does not belong to the 
nation from which they acquire a passport. Instead, the passport is merely a  
ticket of entry into the EU. As the examples above illustrate, of which far 
more exist, these individuals are removing the nationhood from citizenship. 
As a result, the entire concept of ethnic return migration has now 
resulted in two opposing sides with differing interests moving in opposite 
directions. The nations either have an interest merely in connecting with 
their population abroad or with ameliorating past wrongs. Both are internal; 
both are based on affinity. But, often, the people taking advantage of such 
laws are doing something unique: they are making such passports an 
external benefit, a benefit that will reach twenty-eight nations, and not just 
the one (if at all) through which they have gained entry into the Union. This 
is a new brand of birthright citizenship based instead solely on access, 
without the traditional affinity. 
The role of birthright citizenship laws in the poorer EU nations, 
especially in Eastern Europe, is particularly problematic because these are 
generally the nations where people are bypassing the affinity-based purpose 
of those laws, and simultaneously failing to support their “new” homes. 
Even if the investment citizens mentioned above move elsewhere, they are 
at least forced to make a substantial financial contribution to the 
citizenship-granting country. Although many birthright laws, in contrast, 
are deemed “romantic,” it is unlikely that the enacting nations would 
disregard any economic benefits. Thus, in order to guarantee some 
domestic aid, Eastern European nations should incorporate residency 
requirements; much of Western Europe already does this.204 Not only 
would this assist the nation financially, but it would also likely decrease the 
exploitation of that country’s laws. Although such actions might decrease 
the total number of new citizens, incorporating a short residency 
requirement might actually give further domestic support, as some of those 
individuals now being required to reside in the country might actually 
choose to stay. 
Further, the new restitution-based laws, specifically those from Spain 
and Portugal, illuminate another difficulty. These laws have opened a 
Pandora’s Box for the EU filled with minimal predictability, based on a 
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wide array of possible historical misconduct that might be righted. With 
Spain and Portugal’s recent attempts to pass citizenship laws to “make up 
for” their medieval Inquisitions, it is uncertain where this path ends. The 
difficulty with the effectuation of laws based on such remote “wrongs” is 
that they bring about significant line-drawing problems. Should Spain and 
Portugal also grant citizenship to any Muslim who can prove descent from 
the Spanish Moriscos expelled with the Jews?205 For that matter, should 
England pass a citizenship law under which any descendant of a Puritan 
forced to flee to the New World can gain English citizenship?206 Each 
minority is important, and each minority has its own set of difficult 
moments in history. At some point, however, EU nations must have some 
standard by which they can control inflow. And until, if ever, we realize a 
borderless citizenship akin to Joppke’s citizenship light theory, such 
control remains necessary. 
If the EU studies this issue and finds that steps must be taken, there is 
a line that can be drawn: EU nations could exclude reparation citizenship 
laws based on distant wrongs. Limitations like affinity or language tests are 
a start, but they are probably not sufficient. One potential limitation is to 
delineate wrongs based on limited ancestry, similar to the approach taken 
in many countries, such as Ireland, where citizenship can be granted only 
as far back as one’s grandparent.207 The primary purpose of this limitation 
is to increase the likelihood that new citizens will actually feel and 
maintain a connection with the country, which would likely lessen back-
door exit into neighboring nations. Additionally, such limitations would 
increase the probability of the individual actually knowing and 
understanding the event for which that person is receiving restitution.208 
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For instance, under this approach, Germany’s citizenship law for Jews 
would stay in place because the survivors are still living, and so are their 
descendants who knew the survivors and understood their hardships. Five 
centuries from now, however, it is unlikely that Germany’s policy will still 
be in place; at some point, it will likely be phased out as the connectedness 
phases out. This is not to say that what Spain and Portugal are doing is 
wrong; in fact, it feels quite right. But from a legal perspective, these 
actions have significant unforeseen consequences.209 There are many ways 
to recompense an individual; granting citizenship, however, might not be 
the best action in such situations.210 
CONCLUSION 
This Note brings to light a very new phenomenon developing in 
Europe, sparked by late twentieth century developments. First, dual 
citizenship, once considered illegal, is now accepted across the globe and 
especially in Europe. Second, Europe has become transnational through the 
creation of the European Union, the twenty-first century inclusion of the 
former Eastern Bloc, and the all-important right of an EU citizen to move 
and reside freely in any EU nation. Meanwhile, countries continue to 
develop citizenship laws based on birthright, whether through heritage or as 
restitution for an internal or external “wrong.” These three factors have, 
together, led thousands of non-Europeans to become re-acclimated with the 
Old World of their ancestors’ European past by gaining a second 
citizenship to one of twenty-eight EU member states. 
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The novelty is that an affinity for their homeland no longer underlies 
these citizens’ interest; instead their interest is tied to access. These 
birthright EU citizens are thus altering the traditional understanding of 
what it means to be a citizen and of the responsibilities citizenship has 
traditionally required. The EU now needs to take the lead and research this 
field as time goes on and as these new citizenship laws emerge in order to 
understand the quantity of non-EU citizens gaining access through this 
“back door” and what impact this has on the EU nations’ economies and 
labor markets. Although there are some concerns associated with the 
phenomenon, it is plausible that the EU might nonetheless find a net 
economic benefit to the Union and choose, as a result, not to act further. In 
the meantime, however, it is time to start researching your family tree. 
 
